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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
PERCY L. WILDER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 20140416-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
The State is incorrect in its response. Mr. Wilder was entitled to question a juror 
about his knowledge of his family. There was insufficient evidence to convict him of the 
aggravated kidnapping charge. Mr. Wilder's aggravated kidnapping conviction should 
have merged into his aggravated sexual assault conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Mr. Wilder did not have an opportunity to question 
the juror as to his familiarity with Mr. Wilder and 
his family 
According to the State, Mr. Wilder had "an unfettered opportunity to question the 
juror" and was unable to "refute any fact in the juror's sworn statement that was material 
to bias." Aple's Br. at 16, 22. In essence, the State argues that because Mr. Wilder had 
been in contact with the juror outside of a legal proceeding and failed to provide any 
evidence actually showing the juror was biased, the court was not required to hold an 
evidentiary hearing. Aple's Br. at 16-30. 
1 
There are several problems with the State's reasoning. First, the State assumes that 
because Mr. Wilder spoke to the juror outside of court, that he was aware of all of the 
implications of juror bias during that first conversation. This clearly was not the case. Mr. 
Wilder, at three court hearings following his interview of the juror, asserted that he had 
evidence to contradict not only what he told the State, but what he told the defense team. 
He repeatedly asked the court to present this evidence and these requests were denied. 
Mr. Wilder did not fail to proffer evidence. Rather, the court did not allow him the 
opportunity to show the juror's biases or the juror's fabrications regarding his knowledge 
of Mr. ,i\Tilder's family. 
At the first hearing, following Mr. Wilder's interview of the juror, the State 
proffered the same argument they now make on appeal: that Mr. Wilder could not show 
juror bias. R. 179:4. However, defense counsel immediately responded, "some of the stuff 
he told us-we have evidence wasn't true, too." R. 179:4 (emphasis added). The court asked 
him if he had evidence that the juror was lying. R. 179:4. Counsel responded that the 
juror lied about going to junior high for one year and vaguely knowing the defendant's 
sons. R. I 79:4. He had evidence from one of the defendant's sons, who was there to 
testify, as well as school year books which contradicted the juror's statements. R. 179:4. 
The defendant's daughter also knew the juror, which also challenged the juror's assertion 
that he did not know the family. R. 179:4-5. 
At the second hearing, Mr. Wilder again asserted that he needed to cross-examine 
the juror to fully make the court aware of the issues relating to its decision. R. 180:3. And 
at the third hearing, Mr. Wilder told the court that there were continuing credibility 
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problems and that they needed to cross-examine the juror and present evidence to show 
those contradictions. R. 181:3-4. As counsel told the court, "[o]ur conversations with him 
... [were] not exactly the same as what he told the State. I think the court should hear 
that and make a decision based upon testimony and subject to cross-examination." R. 
181:4. 
The record does not show a passive defendant who idled and failed to produce 
evidence. While Mr. Wilder spoke with the juror, it was only after the conversation that he 
was able to procure evidence contradicting the juror's assertions. He needed an 
evidentiary hearing to show the court the juror's biases and misstatements. 
The State's argument also fails to account for the fact that the juror was not 
subject to cross-examination. The reliability of evidence, the Supreme Court has said, 
must be tested "in the crucible of cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
61, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). The exposure of a witness's bias "is 
a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
examination." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. 
Ed. 2d 674 (1986). A defendant should not be "prohibited from engaging in otherwise 
appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of 
the witness." Id. at 680; State v. Hamblin, 2010 UT App 239, if 22, 239 P.3d 300; Olden v. 
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (per curiam) ("the 
cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness") 
(internal quotation omitted). While the juror was not a witness in a trial, per se, the 
accuracy of his testimony must be tested through cross-examination. 
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Cross-examination has been called "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 
ed. 1974); see also ,villiam Blackstone, Commentaries, at 373-74 (1783) ("This open 
examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more 
conducive to the clearing up of truth .... "); Matthew Hale, History and Analysis of the 
Common Law of England 258 (1713) ("[P]ersonal and open examination, [with the] 
opportunity . . . to propound occasional questions, ... beats and bolts out the truth much 
better than when the witness only delivers a formal series of his knowledge without being 
interrogated."). 
The juror, had he been subject to cross-examination, may well have revealed the 
contradictions or biases that he did not state in simple interviews, both with the 
prosecution and with the defense. Some of this may come from the solemnity of actually 
facing the defendant in court. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) ("A witness may 
feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will 
harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts."). Or as Justice Douglas noted, the 
person may have distorted his testimony in private, where if forced to testify, he may state 
differently: 
One important benefit from confronting the [witness] ... is the opportunity 
to cross-examine them and rigorously test any dubious statement. As old Sir 
Matthew Hale says, it "beats and boults out the truth much better." Add to 
that the old-fashioned value of putting people face to face out in the open. 
Accusers who secretly confer in private with an official or two and a couple 
of clerks may, as in Hale'~ time, "oftentimes deliver that which they will be 
ashamed to testify publicly." An honest witness may feel quite differently 
when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm 
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greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. He can now understand what 
sort of human being that man is. As for the false witness, the tribunal can 
learn ever so much more by looking at him than by reading an F.B.I. 
abstract of his story. The pathological liar and the personal enemy can no 
longer hide behind a piece of paper. 
Jayv. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 375-76, 76 S. Ct. 919,936,100 L. Ed. 1242 (1956) (Douglas,]. 
dissenting). 
Additionally, the court can better gauge a witness's honesty by assessmg his 
demeanor. Id.; Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence§ 8:3 (2009) ("A testifying witness 
gives her evidence on the witness stand under the gaze of the trier of fact, and her 
demeanor provides valuable clues about meaning and credibility."). 
Another problem with the State's claim (that Mr. Wilder could not prove the juror 
was biased) is that Mr. Wilder was denied an opportunity to present evidence to 
contradict the juror's assertions. Due process requires that criminal defendants have 
"[m] eaningful access to justice," and that "when a State brings its judicial power to bear 
on an individual defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the 
defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-
77 (1985). In order to ensure that indigent defendants have "an adequate opportunity to 
present their claims fairly within the adversary system,"' the United States Supreme 
Court requires that indigent defendants be provided the 'basic tools of an adequate 
defense."' Id. at 77 (further citation omitted). This right applies under article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 4 79, 485 (1984); Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14 (1967); Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 3 I 4, 317 (Utah 1945) (article I section 7 of 
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the Utah Constitution requires a "fair opportunity to submit evidence."); State v. Harding, 
635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981) ("[T]he defendant's right to present all competent evidence 
in his defense is a right guaranteed by the due process clause of our State Constitution, 
Art. I, Sec. 7[.]"); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1985) (federal constitution provides 
criminal defendants the right to '"a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense'"); U tal1 Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (statutory protection). 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution mandates that defendants be able to 
"to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses ... " Utah Const, art I,. 
§ 12. Criminal prosecutions must be fundamentally fair, and one of the "most basic 
ingredients of due process" is "[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 
compel their attendance, if necessary ... " Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485; Washington, 388 U.S. 
at 19. Any restrictions violate a defendant's right to present a defense if they "infring[e] 
upon a weighty interest of the accused," and "are arbitrary or disproportionate to the 
purposes they are designed to serve." Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006); see 
also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) ('The right to compel the witness' presence 
in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not 
embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact"); Harding, 635 
P.2d at 34 ("(T]he defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his defense is a right 
guaranteed by the due process clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7 [.] ") 
(emphasis added). 
Mr. Wilder had the right to compel witnesses to come to court, both for purposes 
of cross-examination, but also to present favorable testimony, in this case, testimony that 
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would contradict the juror's assertions. Without this testimony, the court was left with a 
one-sided and very incomplete picture. For example, one can only imagine if a jury were 
to find guilt based only on the witness statements collected by the police. If those witnesses 
were not cross-examined and if the defendant was not allowed to present evidence, then 
the trial would be grossly unfair. Similarly, the trial court decided the juror's lack of bias 
in this case without having the juror cross-examined and without allowing Mr. Wilder to 
present evidence in rebuttal. 
Last, and most importantly, Mr. Wilder proffered some evidence that at the 
minimum, entitled him to an evidentiary hearing where he could question the juror and 
proffer other relevant evidence. It is important to note that Mr. Wilder did not proffer all 
of the evidence that he had. For example, Mr. Wilder said he had evidence that the juror 
lied about his knowledge of the defendant and his (amily and he mentioned this evidence 
came from two of the defendant's children, his son and his daughter. R. 179:4-5; 184. 
Mr. ,vilder did not detail the nature of their testimony. However, significantly, both 
children correctly recalled their familiarity with this juror. Perhaps the children would say 
that they had a feud with this person or give other reasons why the juror would want to 
hide his relationship with them. 
Counsel told the court that he had evidence showing the juror was lying. R. 1 79:4 
("some of the stuff he told us-we have evidence wasn't true, too."). He also told the court 
that some of his evidence was "not exactly the same" as what the juror told the State. R. 
181 :4. Counsel did not proffer the nature of all of this evidence or of the substance of the 
children's testimony, but he repeatedly told the court that if he were allowed to cross-
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examine the juror and present his evidence that it would paint a different picture and 
show the juror's dishonesty. The court erred in not allowing him that opportunity. 
The State also argues that because the juror bias allegation arose after trial that 
cases discussing pre-trial voir dire are distinguishable. Aple's Br. at 16. While these cases 
may resolve the procedural question differently (a biased juror can be stricken for cause, 
or the court abused its discretion in refusing to strike the juror versus whether a mistrial 
occurred), Mr. ,vilder cited those cases only for their language regarding the harms from 
a biased juror sitting. In any event, that particular question is irrelevant because "[a] 
defendant who is convicted of a crime by a jury comprised of even one member who has 
exhibited actual bias is entitled to a new trial." State v. King, 2008 UT 54, 1 28, 190 P.3d 
1283 (citing United States v. A1artinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 
L.Ed.2d 792 (2000)). "This principle of law is grounded in the presumption that the 
presence of a biased juror so undermines the fairness and impartiality of the verdict that 
the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial can be preserved only by setting aside the 
conviction." Id. If Mr. Wilder is allowed to make this showing in the trial court-which 
opportunity he was denied-then whether this challenge came at the beginning or at the 
end, the key question was whether the juror was in fact biased. 
The State's assertion that Mr. Wilder could have subpoenaed the juror himself 
does not account for the fact that the trial court denied Mr. v\Tilder that opportunity. 
Aple's Br. at 28. The juror failed to respond to the State's subpoena (which was returned 
as at a bad address). R. 180:3-4. But when Mr. Wilder asked to have his investigator 
locate the juror and issue a subpoena, the court declined to allow him to take this step 
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until it had reviewed the juror's CD interview. R. 180:3-4. After it reviewed the tape, it 
refused to allow any questioning or further evidence. R. 181. The fault was not Mr. 
Wilder's, but the court's. 
Mr. Wilder agrees with the State that an evidentiary hearing, where he could 
question the juror and produce further evidence of bias, may be the appropriate solution 
were the court to remand. See Aple's Br at 31-32. That would afford him the opportunity 
he never had below-to present compelling evidence of juror bias. For these reasons, this 
court should remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing as to the 
juror's bias. 
POINT II 
The State failed to prove an aggravated kidnapping 
The State argues that Mr. Wilder failed to preserve his insufficiency of the 
evidence argument because he only made a general, rather than a specific objection. 
Aple's Br. at 34. "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue 
before the district court in such a way that the court is placed on notice of potential error 
and then has the opportunity to correct or avoid the error." State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT 
App 219, 1 10, 189 P.3d 85, cert. denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008). Mr. Wilder argued 
that there was a lack of substantial evidence. R. 177:33-34. This at least put the court on 
notice that Mr. \Nilder the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the two 
charges which allowed the court to remedy the error. 
But even if the issue was not preserved, Mr. Wilder has argued his counsel 
ineffectively failed to make the specific arguments he now asserts on appeal. Aplt's Br. 20-
9 
21. The State responds that defense counsel could not have ineffectively failed to make 
the motion because "he identifies no deficiency in the evidence." Aple's Br. at 34. 
The State first argues there was sufficient evidence because Mr. Wilder's 
"detention and assault in the apartment complex constituted a separate act of aggravated 
kidnapping." Aple's Br. at 41. Grabbing the victim's hair and dragging her was the 
unlawful detention which became an aggravated kidnapping because he had the intent to 
injure, terrorize, or sexually assault her. Aple's Br. at 41. As the State puts it, the jury 
could reasonably assume that Mr. Wilder's intent was "to kidnap the victim to resume his 
sexual assault." Aple's Br. at 42. 
In response to Mr. Wilder's claim that kidnapping requires a more active restraint, 
the State argues that in the hallway Mr. Wilder's "actions confined the victim and limited 
her movement, even if only for a few moments." Aple's Br. at 43. The State cites State v. 
Sanchez, 2015 UT App 27, 1 15, 344 P.3d 191, for the proposition that this limited 
detention met the definition of "detain" or "restrain." Aple's Br. at 43. 
The first problem with this part of the State's analysis is that detain and restrain-
elements of unlawful detention-were not defined for the jury, as they were in Sanchez. In 
Sanchez, the jury was told that the terms meant to "keep from proceeding, delay, keep in 
custody, confine, control, check, repress, limit, or restrict." Sanchez, 20 I 5 UT App 27, 1 
15. Here, however, the jury was only given the elements of the statute. In the absence of a 
specific jury instruction, the jury would be left with the ordinary implications of those 
terms. The definitions of those terms do not comport with Mr. Wilder's conduct. Detain 




Dictionary, detain). Restrain means to use some means of restraint to confine or imprison 
a person or to keep a person under control. Id. (Oxford English Dictionary, restrain.) The 
implication of these terms is a form or confinement or using a form of restraint, such as 
chains or locking someone in a room. The very brief dragging and punch do not fit 
within either of these definitions. 
Additionally, Sanchez did not deal with a sufficiency claim. In that case, the court 
addressed a merger argument, limitedly finding that the defendant's aggravated 
kidnapping conviction did not merge with his assault conviction. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 
27, 11 15-16. Sanchez does not stand for the State's broad proposition that briefly dragging 
a person meets the elements of detain and restrain for an unlawful detention. Rather, it 
only stands for the principle that a trial court can consider a separate act of dragging a 
person fifty-eight feet into a separate apartment, closing the door and engaging in an 
assault as a separate act of kidnapping that did not merge with the underlying assault. 
Thus, Sanchez does not support the State's position and nor did the dragging for mere 
seconds act as a separate kidnapping, since it was merely incidental to the sexual assault. 
To the State, Mr. Wilder did not have to commit a simple kidnapping for the 
conviction-he could have also committed an unlawful detention, which "requires no 
minimum period of detention." Aple's Br. at 44. In Finlayson, this court found that to 
prove aggravated kidnapping "the State was not required to show that [the defendant] 
detained [the victim] for a substantial period of time, provided that the State presented 
sufficient evidence that [the defendant] acted with intent to hinder or delay the discovery 
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or reporting of a felony, or with the intent to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim." State v. Finlayson, 2014 UT App 282,138 cert. denied~ 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2015). 
While the State correctly notes that the jury could have found an aggravated 
kidnapping from an underlying unlawful detention, the detention in this case did not 
meet those elements for the reasons stated supra. The terms detain and restrain were not 
defined for them and the very brief drag and punch were merely incidental to the assault. 
One need only consider two hypotheticals to see tl1e problem. In one case, the 
defendant sexually assaults the victim in the car. In the other, the victim escapes, he grabs 
her and continues ilie sexual assault. In the first case, no separate kidnapping occurs. But 
the defendant's kidnapping conviction depends entirely on whether a victim tries to get 
away or merely stays. The victim who tries to escape will elevate sexual assault into an 
aggravated kidnapping charge and as the court noted in Finlayson "would transform 
virtually every rape and robbery into a kidnaping as well. Id. at 1 23. 
Indeed, a victim need not run away at all, according to the State. If a defendant 
restrains a victim "with threats" as it argues (or even an attempt to restrain it says), then 
an aggravated kidnapping occurs. Aple's Br. at 45-48. Problematically, every sexual 
assault will involve threats. Every sexual assault will involve some degree of detention in 
order to force the person to submit to the attacks. Therefore, an aggravated kidnapping 
will automaticalf:y occur as part of every sexual assault, making the offense a nullity. Thus, 
in order for aggravated kidnapping to occur, it must involve a separate act of detaining a 
person and restraining them, independent of the sexual assault itself. In this case, Mr. 
Wilder's conduct was merely incidental and part of the sexual assault, not a separate act 
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of aggravated kidnapping, and therefore, the State presented insufficient evidence for that 
offense. 
POINT III 
The Finlayson merger test applies because Mr. 
Wilder's conduct was not separated from the 
ongoing sexual assault nor was it sufficient to create 
a separate act of aggravated kidnapping 
The State asserts that the Finlayson merger test does not apply because Mr. Wilder 
"did not commit aggravated kidnapping to facilitate the commission of the sexual 
assault." Aple's Br. at 50. To the State, Mr. Wilder had "already sexually assaulted" 
Peterson when he dragged her for a few seconds in the hallway. Aple's Br. at 51. The 
sexual assault was complete, the State says, and claims the Supreme Court recognized 
that a "post sexual-assault detention ... could ... theoretically support• a separate 
aggravated kidnapping charge ... " Aple's Br. at 51-52. 
This case is not the theoretical case the State hopes for. Notably, its reasoning 
contradicts the State's response in part II of its brief, in which it says "[a] jury could 
reasonably conclude from [the] evidence that Defendant's intent" in chasing Peterson 
and dragging her "was to kidnap the victim to resume his sexual assault ... " Aple's Br. at 42 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 41 (Mr. Wilder "demonstrated an intent to restrain her so 
that he could sexually assault her again either back in his car or somewhere else"); 54 
("The subsequent detention . . . likely constituted an attempt to recapture the victim so 
that defendant could continue his sexual assault"). The State seems to acknowledge the 
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high likelihood that Mr. Wilder did not terminate the sexual assault-that he intended to 
continue it, not start a new one, when he dragged Peterson back to the car. 
However, the State reads this somewhat differently. It sees Mr. Wilder committing 
a sexual assault in the car, Peterson running away, Mr. Wilder assaulting her, then 
dragging her back to the car to commit a separate sexual assault. Aple's Br. at 53-55 ("this 
case consists of two separate assaults"). The State wants to break down a continuous 
sexual assault and split a few seconds off as a separate act. This seems rather illogical, 
given the continuous nature of the assault. It also ignores some of the evidence, 
particularly Mr. Wilder's demand that Peterson have oral sex with him and that she 
undress completely, which had yet to occur when Peterson escaped. R. 176:143, 147-48. 
Indeed, Mr. Wilder asked Peterson for oral sex before he bit her breast and then after the 
bite, continued to demand that Peterson undress. Id. 
According to the State's· evidence, Mr. ,.vilder intended to continue a much more 
serious sexual assault, but Peterson escaped before that could be accomplished. When 
Mr. Wilder chased Peterson, he had not, as the State asserts, already completed his sexual 
assault: he still wanted oral sex and wanted her naked, which were his demands from the 
beginning. The chase and brief drag of Peterson, then, were merely attempts to finish 
what he had already started-to sexually assault her in the way he had demanded. It was 
one continuous, uninterrupted sexual assault, not a sexual assault and break, followed by 
a kidnapping and potential second assault, as the State posits. 
Finlayson, Sanchez, and Lee do not support the State's claim that Mr. Wilder's 
grabbing of Peterson's hair and dragging for a few seconds amounts to a separate act. 
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Rather, those cases support Mr. Wilder's claim that the grabbing and dragging were 
merely incidental to the sexual assault. 
The Supreme Court has noted that the detention must be "significantly 
independent" from the underlying crime, something that did not occur here. State v. 
Mecham, 2000 UT App 24 7, iJ 30. In Sanchez, the defendant assaulted the victim. She 
escaped and was pounding on a door when the defendant dragged her fifty-eight feet 
back into the apartment and shut the door, where he resumed his assault. Sanchez, 2015 
UT App 2 7, iJ 2. The court found several facts significant: 1) that the defend.ant dragged 
the victim 58 feet; 2) that he dragged her back into a shut apartment; 3) that he took her 
from the active aid of someone who was there. Id. atiJiJ 12-15. 
In Lee, the defendant sexually assaulted a woman who was walking with another 
woman. State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, iJiJ 3-4, 128 P.3d 1179. After the women escaped, and 
significantly, thought their encounter was over slowing to a walk, the defendant ran up 
from behind and attacked the women, dragging his prior victim across the highway, 
where he engaged in an other assault. Id. at iJ 5. The Supreme Court rejected a merger 
claim, observing that dragging across the highway was not slight or inconsequential, that 
it was not in the part of the first assault and that it made the assault easier to commit. Id. 
at iJ 34. 
A common element arises from both of these cases. When a defendant assaults a 
victim, who later escapes, but then is recaptured, dragged or taken significant distances to 
a new place and then reassaulted, then a merger analysis does not apply. But here, 
although Peterson did escape and was caught, Mr. Wilder did not drag her a significant 
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distance-he had her mere seconds and did not move her--nor did he take her to a new 
place (across the highway or back to the apartment) where he then continued the assault. 
Indeed, after the brief drag, the assault ended entirely. Thus, Sanchez and Lee are 
inapplicable because their facts involve the relocation of the victim to a new place where 
a new assault occurred. 
Finlayson is much more like this case. In Finlayson, the assault took place in a few 
locations and the defendant forcibly moved the victim multiple times: he grabbed her and 
took her into a bedroom; when she tried to escape, he grabbed her and handcuffed her. 
Then he forced her into his car where he then drove her home. State v. Finlqyson, 2000 UT 
10, 11 4-5, 994 P.2d 1243. Like Finlayson, Mr. Wilder captured an escaping victim and 
continued to assault her but unlike Lee and Sanchez, Mr. ,t\Tilder did not take the victim to 
a new location to continue the assault. Mr. Wilder's case is even lesser than that of 
Finlayson because he did not subsequently imprison, lock up or detain his victim as 
Finlayson clearly did. 
Finally, the State argues that even if the merger test applies here, Mr. Wilder 
cannot show that his counsel ineffectively failed to make the motion because his counsel 
"could have reasonably concluded that the Finlayson test did not apply because the 
detention in the hallway was not committed 'to facilitate' the completed aggravated 
sexual assault." Aple's Br. at 60. However, for the reasons noted supra no reasonable 
attorney could avoid making this argument, since the kidnapping clearly was merely 
incidental to the s~xual assault and was not a separate, independent act. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Wilder asks this court to reverse and remand to 
the district court so that he can question the juror as to his familiarity with Mr. 
Wilder and his family. He also asks the court to either dismiss the aggravated 
kidnapping charge or find that it merged with Mr. Wilder's aggravated sexual 
assault conviction. 
·-, 
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